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REPORT DATE (DD-
French soldiers pretended to search the people, looking for weapons. In particular, one of these soldiers was very nasty with a woman and as a result a brawl started and the French soldiers were killed. Afterward, the whole people of Palermo rose against the French and Charles the 1 st was forced to abandon the city and, by mid April of the same year, the whole island. Since that time, "Vespri Siciliani" has represented the Italian people's will to fight against tyranny and the injustice. For these reasons, in 1992, launching the largest Army homeland security operation since the end of the II World War -with the initial deployment of 9,000 soldiers -to cooperate with the Police Forces in the fight against the organized crime in Sicily, the Italian Army General
Staff decided to give it the name of "Vespri Siciliani." Operation "Vespri Siciliani" -which ended after six years and with more than 150,000 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers deployed in Sicily -has given to the Italian Army a large experience about how to operate in homeland defense, to assure, in cooperation with the Police Forces, the citizens' security. This is a capability that is certainly helpful in the fight against the dangerous threats of the twenty-first century: international terrorism, failed and rogue states. The difference between the internal security and the external security are today almost inexistent. The distinction between combat operations and crisis response operations, between peace support operations and war and, not last, the differences between the threats to the internal security and the threats to the national vital interests, are so feeble that we are required to think and to organize our Armed Forces in a different way." 1 Gen. Goffredo Canino former Chief of Staff of the Italian Army "The Army intervention in a situation of internal crisis is completely adequate to the fundamental role of the Democratic Countries' Armies, as the case of Italy, which are the expression of the national community and have been established to assure, as a primary task, the people's security."
INTRODUCTION

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The employment of the Army for homeland security started soon after the unification of Italy, when the Italian Army was employed from 1860 to 1870 in the South of the peninsula to eradicate the "brigandage", a phenomenon which started as a particular kind of resistance against laws and rules imposed by the new Italian Government.
3 Other times, in the nineteenth century, the Italian Army was employed as a police force, in order to maintain internal order; in some occasions, regrettably, it clashed with the protesters, as happened in Milan on Until the eighties, the Italian Army contributed to the nation's internal security by acting as a limited, supporting force, while the active roles and the contact with the population were exclusively a police force responsibility. It was only in 1992 that the Army was directly involved, with a large number of soldiers, to guarantee the Italian people's internal security.
THE TURNING POINT
The "mafia," was born as a criminal organization at the beginning of the nineteenth century, taking advantage of the particular social condition of the Sicily, whose population was divided between rich, noble landlords and poor, illiterate farm-workers. Between these, a number of brutal people, organized into groups, whose activity took advantage of the situation through extortions. The first judicial document which refers to "mafia" is dated 1837. 8 In the seventies, the "mafia" started to be involved in the international drug traffic and utilized the international bank system for making available its financial resources. In the same period, the "mafia" started to kill anyone who represented an obstacle for its criminal activities: judges, police officers, politicians and even journalists who wanted to inform public opinion. 9 In summer 1992, the "mafia" killed two judges (Giovanni Falcone on May 23, and Paolo Borsellino on July 19), who had started to fight this criminal organization through a new investigative approach, directed against their illegal monetary flows. Because of their success in fighting the "mafia,"
they represented, and still represent, a symbol of the national will to defeat this criminal organization.
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These brutal events, which caused the death of the two judges, Falcone's wife and eight police officers (see Figure 1) , 11 forced the Italian Government to assume the initiative and show the will to oppose organized crime by using any available means. In a ministerial meeting, on July 24, 1992, the Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato decided to deploy in Sicily 9,000 FIGURE 1. THE HIGHWAY "PUNTA RAISI-PALERMO" SOON AFTER THE BOMB ATTACK AGAINST JUDGE GIOVANNI FALCONE soldiers, in order to increase dramatically the number of police officers available to fight the "mafia." On July 25, while the first Army unit -from the airborne Brigade "Folgore" -was arriving in Palermo, the Government approved decree-law 349, 12 giving to the soldiers a particular status which allowed them to act independently, as police officers.
That solution, something absolutely new for Italy, was proposed by Gen. Goffredo Canino, the Italian Army Chief of Staff of the time, and supported by the Police Chief, the Prefect Giuseppe Parisi, in order to give to the Army units more autonomy, the possibility to operate according to their own training and, in general, in order to grant more efficacy to the Army intervention. The operation's coordination would have been maintained, in any case, by the local government authority.
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TYPES OF HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATIONS
Classification
As a first step, it is important to clarify words (see Figure 2 ). According to that, it is possible to identify three different categories of territorial control operations carried out by the Italian Army: § Operations as an auxiliary police force. § Direct support to the national police forces. § Indirect contribution to assure a secure environment.
Operations as an Auxiliary Police Force
This is the case in which Italian Army personnel operate as police officers. The decision is taken by the national Government, which confers to the military -with a specific law -this particular status for a definite area and time.
This status consents the military to operate independently, as an auxiliary police force.
They are allowed to identify people and, if required by the situation, to search persons and vehicles for weapons and explosives. The same status allows the soldiers who are witnesses to a crime or an attempt to commit a crime which put at risk the people's safety and/or the security of the infrastructures under police's vigilance, to arrest the criminals and put them under the control of the police forces in the shortest possible time. On July 25, the Italian Government decided to deploy additional troops to Sicily, in order to give to the Sicily Military Headquarters Commanding General a total availability of 9,000 men.
The soldiers, after receiving police officer status, got the mission to guarantee in cooperation with the police forces: § An in-depth territorial control. § The security of specific buildings and infrastructures.
The units operated under the responsibility of their own commanders and acted according to their particular tactical procedures.
Participants
The operation "Vespri Siciliani" started with three brigade headquarters -one of which is home-based in Sicily -and 9,000 men from four different brigades. After a while, the Army presence settled at about 6,000 soldiers and, from July 1997 to the mission's end at about 4,000 men. In six years, the Army employed in Sicily a total of 150,500 men: which acted as coordinating authority toward the other sectors Districts (see Figure 5 ). An Army
Commander representative was included in the Joint Committee for internal security of the mentioned two districts.
Activities
The activities carried out by Army units were a series of actions, later standardized by specific regulations. 25 In particular (see Table 2 for detailed data), 26 we had: § Surveillance of specific infrastructures and buildings. § Area and road patrols. § Mop up of rural areas. § Checkpoints. § Area security, to facilitate police operations. 
Other aspects
If the operation "Forza Paris," as will be described later, was the first massive deployment of Army units in a different area from the Cold War traditional one (Italian Eastern border), the 
Command and control organization
Because the operation involved the whole Italian territory (40 districts currently), 
Activities
The Army units involved in operation "Domino" have the responsibility to guarantee the security of civilian airports, and both NATO and United States Armed Forces installations. The surveillance is conducted by patrols and checkpoints. According to the rules of engagement, the military are allowed to use the minimum necessary force to accomplish their mission.
Because they do not have a police force status, they can not search people and vehicles.
OPERATION "FORZA PARIS," JULY 15 TO SEPTEMBER 22, 1992
32
Mission
Operation "Forza Paris" is the classic example of the Army's employment to support indirectly the police forces, by contributing to the establishment of a secure environment. The operation was decided after the kidnapping and the crippling of an adolescent in Sardinia.
Farouk Kassam, aged four and son of an Arab entrepreneur living and working in Sardinia, was the last of a large number of persons kidnapped by a Sardinian criminal organization The boy was hidden for more than six months in the "Barbagia", a complex and difficult area, both on geographic and social aspects, near the city of Nuoro.
33
What pushed the Government to act was the public indignation caused by the child's mutilation, 34 which was designed to force his family to pay the ransom. The mission given to the Army was to: § Reduce the freedom-of-action of the local criminals. § Socialize with the local people, who were not really used to the military presence. § Show the government's will to maintain control over the Homeland, by conducting counter-area-interdiction training into an area of about 1,400 square miles, and developing social and public utility activities for a two month period.
Participants
The operation "Forza Paris" involved Army units from five different brigades, with 8,000
men, 2,000 tactical vehicles and 3,000 tons of material totally deployed. 35 The daily presence on the ground was of about 5,000 soldiers. 
Activities
During the two months of the operation "Forza Paris," the Army units were involved in both military training and public utility activities. The military training included: § Counter-area-interdiction exercises at company level. § Reconnaissance patrols and deployment marches. § Live-fire exercises at platoon level.
According to an U.S. Army officer who participated to the mission, as a result of the operation "Forza Paris," violent crime in the area dropped 88%, arson 53% and the illegal use of explosives 76%, when compared with the same period of the previous year. 37 During this period, the Geographic Military Institute conducted in the area a mapping campaign, in order to update the area's maps.
As public utility activities, the engineer and the combat service support units carried out: § Road repairs. § Water delivery. § Medical assistance and disinfestation activities.
In 45 days, the Army employed in public utility activities a total of 3,230 men and 53 vehicles.
A unique activity was the more than 2,000 blood-donations from the soldiers.
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Other aspects
As already mentioned, a particular aspect of the operation "Forza Paris" was the deployment phase, which tested the Army's ability to rapidly deploy large units. The time between the activation order and the units' arrival in Sardinia was no longer than a week. One has to think that at that time, the Army was mainly home-based near the Eastern border, on a Cold War posture, where the major training areas were. So, the Army had no reason to organize and train for large deployments. To deploy to Sardinia the units participating in the operation "Forza Paris" 65 used both military and civilian flights and 16 ferryboat trips.
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BORDER CONTROL OPERATIONS
Between 1993 and 1995, during the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Italian Army conducted two border control operations, one on the Italian-Slovenian border (Operation "Testuggine") and the other on the Adriatic coastline, facing Albania (Operation "Salento"). The purpose of the operations was to control the illegal immigration flow from the former Yugoslavia area (see Figure 6 ).
These operations are important, in order to secure borders against the threats of international terrorism and to protect the Homeland from the problems that mass illegal migration could bring. Operation "Salento," May 10 to November 3, 1995 43 The second operation that we want to examine is operation "Salento," conducted during the Summer of 1995 in Puglia -the Italian region which faces Albania -to stop the illegal entry of Albanians. The mission, like operation "Testuggine", was conducted by patrolling the coastline and establishing checkpoints on the main roads which move from the coast to the interior. The soldiers operated with a police force status.
Operation
On the ground, the Army deployed daily 650 soldiers. During the six months of operation "Salento" the following were utilized:
44 § 208 officers. § 466 non-commissioned officers. § 1,552 enlisted.
For the first time, ground surveillance radars were utilized in territorial control operations, to detect people and vehicles. The command and control and the operation was held by the commander of the Army brigade home-based in Puglia, who was in charge of coordinating activity with the local district joint committees for internal security.
As a result of the activities listed in Table 3, the Army: 45 § Stopped 3,398 illegal immigrants. § Checked 2,752 persons and 865 vehicles.
Activities #
Area patrols 523
Mop up 10 Checkpoints 1,852 
THE ITALIAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
THE NATIONAL LEGISLATION
It is interesting, before examining the Army regulations on Homeland Security, to describe how the Italian Republic is organized to assure its internal security. The Ministry of the Interior is the national authority for internal security. 46 Its responsibility is to: § Guarantee internal security. § Direct internal security activities. § Coordinate the different police forces.
47
To coordinate the police forces, the Ministry leads the National Joint Committee for internal Security, which is composed of the Vice-Ministry for Internal Security, the chiefs of the police forces and, when necessary, of a representative of the military.
48
At local level (District), the prefect is the authority for internal security as local representative of the national government. On internal security matters, the prefect exerts at local level the same responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. For this purpose, as previously mentioned, he leads the District Joint Committee for internal security, which is composed of the local police force commanders and, when necessary, of a representative of the military.
49
According to the laws, the prefects could ask for military personnel if they do not have an adequate number of police officers to guarantee the local security.
The authorization is the government's responsibility, which decides according to the advice of both the Ministries of Defense and Interior. If the mission's characteristics suggest to
give the military a police officer status, a parliamentary decision is needed. The consequent law must state the nation's area and the period in which the status applies.
On Table 4 are listed the main Italian laws applicable to territorial control operations.
50
Law
Main aspects
Unified text on Police Officer regulations. As mentioned, the Italian Army has carried out Homeland Security activities, and in particular territorial control operations, since the eighteenth century, but looking at the period after World War II, it was only after the conclusion of " Forza Paris" and the start of operation "Vespri Siciliani" that the Army General Staff focused on the need for a specific doctrine (see Table 5 ). Actually, at joint level, the publication "SMD-G-006 Instructions for military support of civil authorities in peacetime" -published in 1991 -already indicated how the military could have been employed, as a part of the internal security effort, to secure public infrastructures and buildings, and cooperate with the police forces to ensure the territorial control. 
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On tactical procedures, the manual describes how company and platoon commanders have to conceive, organize and execute: § Building and infrastructure surveillance. § Road and railway surveillance. § Border and coastline surveillance, to deal with illegal immigration. § Crowd control. § Logistic support to refugees and homeless.
For area control and area surveillance, the reference tactical manual is the one on area and counter-area interdiction.
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The second step was the inclusion in the new Army doctrine capstone document, published in 1998, of the "Presence and Surveillance" mission among the main Army tasks.
54
That mission, which is the equivalent of the U.S. Homeland Security, was given as a major focus for the units manned with draft-soldiers. As a consequence, all the new Army doctrine publications include one or more paragraphs on related to Homeland Security operation aspects.
The last specific publication on homeland security is the "Army Operational Outlines in Territorial Control," published by the Army General Staff on 2000. The manual examines these particular operations at both operational and tactical level. 55 After describing the general context and the legislation applicable to territorial control operations, the publication illustrates: § Main principles with respect to when Army units and personnel are employed in territorial control operations, that are really similar to the ones mentioned in the U.S. joint doctrine on Civil Support (see Table 6 ). § Commanders' responsibilities and command and control arrangements (see 
CONSIDERATIONS
RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED
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The most important result the Italian Army has obtained through the territorial control operation, and in particular "Forza Paris" and "Vespri Siciliani", was to experience on the ground the main aspects of the military operations other than war (MOOTW). This knowledge was spread to a large number large number of personnel, in particular officers and NCOs, who were later deployed in Africa and in the Balkans, to accomplish UN and NATO operations, as recently underlined by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Italian Army. 60 In addition, the Army has driven some important lessons learned, which have been utilized in the doctrinal, organizational and acquisition fields.
Operational aspects
On the operational aspect, the main lessons were: § Units and soldiers employed in low intensity operations and routine activities are inclined to decrease their level of attention after about 40-60 days. That affects directly the force protection issue, so that a two-month tour cycle for territorial control operations has been determined to be appropriate. 65 § In territorial control operations, but the same rule applies to peace support operations, the more valuable information gathering system is personnel.
Therefore, it has been necessary to focus back on HUMINT, a branch of
Intelligence that was considered out-of-date.
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Logistical aspects and equipments
Moving to logistics and equipment, the experiences acquired on the ground were about: § Expeditionary equipments, which proved to be qualitatively acceptable but not available in adequate numbers for large deployments.
67 § Standard military rifles, which were evidently not easy to manage in buildings and, generally, in urban areas. 68 Now, each infantry unit has available a number of machine-pistols to face particular operational situations. § The inadequacy of standard military portable radios, when utilized in urban areas.
After the first negative experiences, the Army acquired specific radio systems.
69 § The necessity to improve training and procedures on transportation.
70
Training aspects
On training, the Army took advantage of experience acquired in territorial control operations, to develop a two-week training module (ten working days), which soldiers go through during the basic training (first five months of duty).
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The module is composed of three parts: § Lessons on specific laws and regulations: one day. § Tactical procedures and live-exercises: 7 days. § Weapons drill: 2 days.
LOOKING AT THE NEW THREATS
The National Security Strategy of the 
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The same Report articulates a 3-D Strategy to defeat the terrorism -defeating, deterring and diminishing -in which each phase is simultaneous and connected with the others. 75 Some of the elements of these phases ask for capabilities which are shared with the Homeland Security operations and, in particular, with the civil support. I refer to the capacity to: § Support the establishment of a democratic government, after a regime-change in a country that was supporting international terrorism or tolerating a terrorist presence on its own territory (nation building). § Prevent crises, or potential crises, from giving terrorists the opportunity to justify their actions and encourage recruitments (peace support operations, during the stabilization phase).
If, as examples, we look at the ongoing operations "International Security Allied Force" Units and soldiers which have experienced civil support operations are better prepared to accomplish peace support missions, which are normally conducted in a less safe environment.
Therefore, by contributing to the Homeland Security, the Army achieves two results: § Directly helps in defeating international terrorism. § Trains its own soldiers and units to carry out other operations related with the War on Terrorism.
In addition, the Italian circumstance, having experienced the need for civil support operations against a different and previous threat from the international terrorism, has given the nation the opportunity to develop a full set of laws and regulations on how to effectively employ the Army in such an environment. Siciliani.
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When later, the Army was involved in UN and NATO operations in Africa and in the Balkans, the military, and in particular the young officers, started to look at the territorial control missions as something that was absorbing significant resources and energies, and reducing their opportunity to be employed abroad. They did not realize that the tactics the Army units were applying in peace support operations were learned, tested and upgraded working in the Homeland, side by side with the local authorities and the police forces, 77 and more important, they did not realize that security in the new strategic environment is a wider concept, which involves the protection of our cities and our people from any kind of threat. I like to conclude this research project with the words that Claudio Graziano has written in the book Operazione Vespri Siciliani on his experience in the operation "Forza Paris" as battalion commander:
78 "I was there, and I do not the reason why, I have always thought that "Forza Paris" has been the beginning of what happen later; after we had the operations in Sicily, in Calabria, in Naples and in Salento, and abroad, in Somalia, in Mozambique and in Rwanda. But only after "Forza Paris". Some months later I was in Mozambique, and it was a good thing that all officers and NCOs of the "Susa" battalion and many volunteers had previously spent hours patrolling the "Barbagia". It was good for all, and overall it was good for Italy."
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